ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND WEAK ANTHROPOCENTRISM NORTON PDF

June 16, 2020 0 Comments

Bryan G.· Norton, “Environmental Ethics and Weak. Anth ropocentrism,” Environmental Ethics,. Vol. 6, No.2 (Summer ), pp. Anthropocentrism is. In Bryan G. Norton’s article entitled, “Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism,” Norton explains his perspective of how an adequate environmental. A Pragmatic Approach to Environmental Ethics: Norton’s Weak Anthropocentrism. Blog Environmentalists have struggled with a pragmatic.

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The trust analogy presents us with two levels: As Baird Callicott puts it: However, Bryan Norton has argued that the “assumption that envi ronmental ethics must be nonanthropocentric in order to be adequate is mistaken. But he does not indicate in his paper specifically what is of intrinsic value eyhics a weak anthropocentric position and how it differs from the strong anthropocentric posit io n.

Likewise, many reports confirm that wolves are necessary to regulate the rodent prey problem in Alaska. Karim Jebari – – Philosophy and Technology 29 3: Request removal from index. Anthropocentrism —humans are the only loci of intrinsic value.

Norton’s Weak Anthropocentrism

They must take human ideals seriously enough so that they can be set against preference satisfaction as a limit upon them. For example, I can meet my desire for sustenance by either making a sandwich in my kitchen or buying one from a deli. Laura Westra – – In Ben A. In this way the weak anthropocentric position may hold that some things over and above human states and experiences may have anthrropocentrism intrinsic value.

Bryan G. Norton, Environmental ethics and weak anthropocentrism – PhilPapers

Hume’s Knave and Nonanthropocentric Virtues. According to Norton, anthropocentrism is the idea that only humans have intrinsic value, and they are the only organisms at the center of this value.

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: By such valuing of certain hu man experiences or states this ethic would allow for the censure or praise of actions done by humans toward the environment, in light of whether the actions hindered or aided in the realization of these ex periences.

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Against this position nonanthropocentrists argue that, while humans are the source of value, some nonhuman enti ties are loci of fundamental value. By focusing on these features nonanthropocentrists have argued for a new ethic of the environment based on a new theory of intrinsic value.

Norton defines strong anthropocentrism as a value theory that is explained by reference to satisfaction of some felt preference of a human individual.

How do these people create an objective value system that builds on global considered preferences, while encouraging humans environmeental uphold obligations to the natural world? On the other hand, nonanthropocentrism is the belief that human beings are the source of all values, but that they can designate nonhuman objects as the center or focus of fundamental values.

Most writers apply this term to positions which treat humans as the only locus of intrinsic value. He illustrates what he sees as the inadequacy of the standard anthropocentric axiologies with a thought experiment concern ing the moral behavior of the last people. weaj

Laura Westra – – Environmental Ethics 19 3: Alaskan hunters use airplanes to track and shoot wolves in the wild. You are commenting using your WordPress. He ar gues that a modified anthropocentric axiology can be sufficient upon which to base a truly environmental et h ic. Note that in an anthropocentric theory the reference for morality is still human experience, values, or preferences.

A Pragmatic Approach to Environmental Ethics: Norton’s Weak Anthropocentrism

The weakly anthropocentric view makes possible the kind of environmental ethics described earlier by Callicott, that is, an ethic that provides reasons to praise or censure certain norrton actions toward the environ ment. Since the prohibitions against actions that have negative effects only in the future necessary for a truly environmental ethic cannot, Norton holds, be derived from indi vidualistic ethical systems, his weak anthropocentric position is appeal ing to environmentally sensitive individuals in that such prohibitions can be derived from his position.

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You are commenting using your Twitter account. Such a collapse would occur if “all values can, ultimately, be int e r p ret ed as satisfaction of pr efe re nce s. environmfntal

Norton’s Weak Anthropocentrism | existjg

Norton claims that his position is simpler conceptually while pro viding the features desired for a truly environmental ethic. It must envirommental noted, however, that in this position intrinsic value is always going to posited in nature by humans, for the weak anthropocentric position, as so modified, makes no reference to any values in nature independent of the valuing done by humans.

But in his development of the weak anthropocentric position he does not indicate clearly just what can from such a position be judged to be of intrinsic value. He argues that the general rejection of an thropocentrism so prevalent in environmental ethics is not required, and.

Norton admits that adequacy falls short of correctness or truth. He concludes that weak anthropocentrism can meet the adequacy criterion. The goal is to create what Tom Regan[3] has called “an ethic of the environment” rather than “an ethic for the envi ronment”, the latter being an ethic for the management of the environ ment for better instrumental, utilitarian concerns of humans.

In this way, one could claim that a natural entity is valued anthropoccentrism only for its value in satisfying human needs such as aestheitc satisfaction, scientific curiou sity, recreation needs, or spiritual renewal, but also just for what it is in itself. This position recognizes that some preferences can be considered, i. This has two principles: